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Introduction 
The traditional arena of human rights discourse and practice made little or no allowance 
for the rapidly growing international phenomenon of bureaucratic corruption.1 In the 
recent past, states have consistently maintained that bureaucratic corruption, on the basis 
of the norm of non-intervention, was strictly a domestic issue and thus outside the 
competence of international bodies2, such as the United Nations. This is no longer the 
case, for states have now gradually come to grips with the realization that bureaucratic 
corruption is a debilitating governmental anomaly that admits of no national boundaries, 
and assaults the social, economic and cultural integrity of all nations, albeit at varying 
degrees of intensity3. The vast literature on corruption approaches its incidence and 
effects almost invariably from a political and economic perspective, and rightly conclude 
that where prevalent, social welfare suffers in terms of anemic economic growth and 
diminished opportunities4
 
.  
A new approach in analyzing the effects of bureaucratic corruption that looks beyond the 
traditional areas of inquiry is now, more than ever, imperative. It is here argued that the 
traditional approach is too limited, and fails to recognize the broader social impact of 
corruption on individuals and collectivities. This work, therefore, adopts a rights-based 
approach to the analysis of bureaucratic corruption and its effects on fundamental human 
rights. The thesis here espoused is that bureaucratic corruption, where endemic and 
sustained, leads to suppressions of human rights through its damaging effects on 
economic development.   It is further posited that when states, cognizant of prevalent 
corruptive practices, either fail to take preventive measures or tacitly encourage its 
observance, are derelict in their duties and the obligations assumed as signatories to the 
United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).5
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 A Human Rights Approach to the study of Bureaucratic Corruption 
Bureaucratic corruption is always and everywhere a symptom of domestic institutional 
failures even though its incidence and extent are global.6 For years social scientists, 
especially economists, have consistently implicated its incidence as one of the principal 
reasons for the abysmal economic growth in developing nations.7 The literature on the 
subject is decidedly one-dimensional in that the overriding objective has been, and 
continues to be, inquiries in to the economic and moral considerations of corruptive 
practices by public officials.8 There is yet to be a sustained effort to highlight the equally 
destructive effects of bureaucratic corruption on human rights, and how these rights are 
marginalized by its endemic and pervasive presence. A rights-based approach to the 
problems posed by bureaucratic corruption would entail an analysis of how corruption 
affects internationally recognized human rights, and what can be done to protect and 
promote such rights. For decades, the UN and other international bodies shied away from 
this subject on the mistaken belief that corruption is a domestic matter, and should be 
handled by individual states.9 The globalization of trade and other worldly affairs, 
however, soon alerted the international community of the dangers associated with 
domestic bureaucratic corruption; this includes, among others, its potential impact on 
world markets and the stability of commodity prices.10 But more was needed to prompt 
world leaders into action; the impetus came by way of the 1977 passage in the US of the 
Foreign Corruption Practices Act.11 This act ushered in a new era in the study and 
treatment of corruption, and for the first time the issue of corruptive practices within 
national boundaries was elevated onto the international stage thereby providing policy 
makers and anti-corruption advocates a substantial instrument with which to aggressively 
address this matter.12 The ensuing international focus on corruption made it possible to 
re-define corruption as a transnational phenomenon with serious repercussions on human 
rights and development in developing countries.13
 
 States were now obliged to respond 
differently, and assume the primary role in arresting the prevalence of corruptive 
practices. 
While one of the earliest efforts to combat corruption at the international level was put in 
place by the Organization of American States (OAS) with its 1996 Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption,14 other international bodies soon became actively 
engaged with a proliferation of conventions and promulgations. In February, 1999, the 
OECD adopted the ‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Official in 
International Business Transactions.’15 In the same year the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) adopted policies that would deny financial benefits to countries with endemic 
corruption, and the potential to subvert economic recovery programs;16
 
 these policies 
required recipient countries to adopt meaningful transparency and accountability 
protocols in their public sectors.  
In 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration against corruption and bribery 
in international transactions (Res. 51/191,1996).17 A second declaration by the UN 
General Assembly (Res. 51/59, 1996),18 adopted an international code of conduct for 
public officials in recognition of the disruptive effects of corruption in international 
transactions. This declaration was followed by UN resolution ‘On International 
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Cooperation Against Corruption and Bribery In International Transactions’ (Res. 52/87, 
1997).19 Finally, on October 31, 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 
58/4, and thus created the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.20
 
 In his formal 
statement before the UN General Assembly on the adoption of this convention, the UN 
Secretary General, Kofi Annan declared: 
“Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately— by diverting funds intended for 
development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding 
inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid”.21
 
 
 Given this prominence, a sustained discourse on corruption from a human rights 
perspective promises to attract the attention needed to find anti-corruption measures by 
highlighting the responsibilities of states to constantly enact public policies that are 
conducive and malleable to the furtherance of human rights. Such sustained effort would 
also serve to educate policy makers on their roles as the principal protectors of the rights 
of their citizens, and the need to promulgate policies that do not accommodate breaches 
of fundamental human rights.  
 
 Objective And Methodology  
This paper seeks to examine the effects of bureaucratic corruption on human rights by 
constructing competing economic models that illustrate the processes by which the 
deleterious effects of corruption are felt by individuals and collectivities. This effort, 
while sympathetic to previous efforts and conclusions, acquires its novelty by looking at 
the same problem from a human rights perspective, and adopts a fresh approach in its 
inquiry into the mechanisms by which corruption affects guaranteed rights. Using the 
principal provisions of the United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, my thesis postulates that when States fail to contain and minimize 
the incidence of bureaucratic corruption, they necessarily breach their duties, and the 
obligations assumed as signatories to this convention. To test the viability of this thesis, 
economic models of corruption will be employed to demonstrate possible economic 
outcomes of different degrees of bureaucratic corruption, and the attendant impact on 
development and human rights. 
 
 
 A Brief Review of the literature on Modern Human Rights Regime 
Up until the mid 1970s, the literature on corruption focused almost exclusively on its 
effects on national economies. The consensus then, as earlier noted, was that the 
operative international norm of non-intervention required nations to treat activities with 
purely domestic character as internal affairs, and thus outside the competence of 
international concerns. This approach of treating corruption as a national issue was 
further justified on the grounds that “Corruption has no single definition, and varies from 
region to region”.22 The Council of Europe insists that a precise definition that applies to 
all forms and degrees of corruption is untenable.23 Accordingly, Morgan observes that the 
consequence of a lack of universal consensus on what constitutes corruption has led to an 
acceptance of a minimalist definition in the literature.24 
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The issue of whether customary practices, legal traditions, and cultural observances 
should be given sufficient allowance in developing anti-corruption measures is much 
discussed in the literature. Morgan wonders whether a uniform standard of anti-
corruption efforts leads to good governance or simply misguided attempt to impose 
subjective values that are foreign to specific cultures.25 Recognizing the existence of 
multiplicity of cultures and traditional observances, the literature takes full account of the 
fact that what may be regarded as corrupt in one country may be perfectly acceptable in 
another.26 However, many writers insist on highlighting the difference between gift 
giving and bribery; the former is usually nominal in value, given in public, and purely 
ceremonial in character; while the later tends to be substantial, and tendered with the 
expectation of reciprocity.27
 
 In the same vein, Rose-Ackerman observes that many 
scholars of developing countries do not believe that traditional gift giving gives rise to the 
practice and wide spread acceptance of corruption as a social norm. And notes:  
“Combating corruption is not an end in itself. The struggle 
against malfeasance is part of the broader goal of creating 
effective government. Reformers are not just concerned 
with corruption per se but with its distortionary effect on 
development and society. Widespread corruption is a sign 
that something has gone wrong in the relationship between 
the state and society”28
 
 
 Modern Human Rights Regime  
The notion that human rights should be a matter of international concern is a relatively 
modern one; and indeed modern international human rights law as currently understood is 
a ‘post-World War II phenomenon.’29 But this is not to suggest that the desire to 
recognize and protect the rights of individuals is of recent origin, for the history of 
civilization informs us that as far back as the thirteenth century, ‘there were discernable 
international efforts’30
 
 to protect the rights of religious minorities. These efforts persisted, 
and with time, expanded the field to include the protection of ethnic, linguistic, and 
national minorities. The advent of the United Nations gradually shifted the focus from the 
protection of minority rights to that of individual rights. 
The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General 
Assembly in 1948 ushered in the modern human rights regime.31 However, in order to 
give effect to the ideals and pronouncements contained in the declaration, two covenants 
were subsequently adopted, albeit decades later. These covenants, the International 
Covenant on civil and political Rights (ICEPR),32 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),33 together with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights constitute what is commonly known as the International 
Bill of Human Rights. Thus, while the Universal Declaration furnishes the philosophical 
and jurisprudential justifications for the covenants, the two covenants in turn provide the 
substantive and procedural mechanisms for the implementation of articulated rights. In 
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this regard, civil and political rights of individuals find form and substance in the ICCPR, 
while the ICESCR serves as the primary repository of economic, social and cultural 
rights. But this apparent ‘division of labour’ between the covenants is not without its 
detractors; and rightly so for international instruments designed to gain sustenance 
through consensus.  
 
The perennial debate since the adoption of both covenants is whether the core rights 
contained in one covenant are superior to those contained in the other; and if so, then the 
covenant with the ‘inferior’ set of core rights should be implemented with care or risk the 
potential dilution of the entire human rights’ regime.34 Specifically, proponents of what 
has commonly been referred to as ‘first generation’ rights – civil and political rights, have 
entertained the view that economic, social and cultural rights as contained in the ICESCR 
cannot be properly defined as rights, but are rather, ideals and aspirations that states 
should strive to attain. Furthermore, ‘treating them as rights undermines the enjoyment of 
individual freedom, distorts the functioning of free markets … and provides an excuse to 
downgrade the importance of civil and political rights.’35 But proponents of economic 
and social rights are equally adamant; to them, an illiterate starved to the point of 
privation has no use for freedom of speech or the right to exercise his political franchise 
as a citizen.36
 
 Hence, they argue for the pre-eminence of economic and social rights in the 
advocacy and implementation of human rights.  
This work adopts the view that while advocates of the two sets of rights have merits in 
their arguments, they are, however, mistaken in their conclusions for the simple reason 
that the premise on which they erect their respective arguments is faulty --- the 
divisibility of rights. It will be argued that human rights, regardless of the instruments 
that define their form, are interdependent and indivisible, for each set of rights provides 
anchor and nourishment for other rights, and these other rights do the same for the first 
set of rights; and at the end, a symbiotic relationship of rights that informs the ‘whole’ is 
ultimately created. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 adopts this 
view,37 and it is the view adhered to by many nations.38 Indeed the Limburg39 Principles 
on the implementation of the ICESCR, and the 1997 Maastricht Guidelines40
 
 on 
Violations of ICESCR clearly hold that the different obligations emphasized by both 
covenants do not imply inequality. 
While an increasing body of jurisprudence adopts the view that rights articulated in both 
covenants are indivisible,41
 
 it is the case that the operational effects of bureaucratic 
corruption are largely felt through the debasement of rights contained in the ICESCR, 
which in turn infects the core rights contained in the ICCPR. This is a fundamental 
premise of this discourse.  
The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social, and Cultural Right 
The ICESCR provides more details of the economic, social and cultural rights articulated 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and encompasses, among others, the 
following rights: to a reasonable standard of living, to work, to just and favorable 
conditions of work, to education, to the highest possible standard of health, to family life, 
and to take part in cultural life. It requires countries that have ratified to ensure the equal 
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rights of both sexes, and prohibits all forms of discrimination in the exercise and 
enjoyment of these rights.42
 
 The Maastricht Guidelines provide a functional interpretation 
of these rights, and the obligations of states. 
The Maastricht Guidelines, which are based on the Limburg Principles,43 are now widely 
accepted as authoritative guides on the responsibilities placed on states by the ICESCR, 
and their culpability when rights are violated. The relevant portions of this document to 
the present discourse are to be found in Art. II, paragraphs 14 and 15; and are as 
follows:44
 
  
Art. II. The meaning of violations of economic, social and cultural rights45
 
…. 
14. Violations can occur through the direct actions of states or other entities insufficiently 
regulated by states. Examples of such violations include: 
 
(g) The reduction or diversion of specific public expenditure, when such reduction or 
diversion results in the non-enjoyment of such rights and is not accompanied by adequate 
measures to ensure minimum subsistence rights for everyone. 
 
15. Violations can also occur through omissions or failure of states to take necessary 
measures stemming from legal obligations. Examples of such violations include: 
(d) The failure to regulate activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from 
violating economic, social and cultural rights. 
(e) The failure to utilize the maximum of available resources towards the full realization 
of the Covenant. 
(f) The failure to monitor the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights, 
including the development and application of criteria and indicators for assessing 
compliance. 
… 
(i) The failure to meet a generally accepted international minimum standard of 
achievement, which is within its powers to meet. 
 
The principal contention of this discourse is that bureaucratic corruption, wherever it 
flourishes, is a symptom of a failure in governance with serious repercussions on 
fundamental human rights, and thus a breach of obligations assumed by states as 
signatories to the ICESCR. The process by which this breach occurs is the subject of the 
next section. 
 
  An Economic Model of Corruption 
Corruption and its distortionary effects are perhaps better understood when analyzed 
within the industrial organizational framework of Homogeneous Oligopoly.46 The work 
by Shleifer and Visny utilized the monopoly model of price theory47 to shed light on the 
consequences of corruption, and to draw parallels between market outcomes under 
monopoly and what obtains in countries with endemic corruption. The preference here 
for the oligopolistic model48 stems from the fact that only a small number of government 
officials are, at any given time, in positions conducive to bribery; and whereas 
 7 
individuals in these positions exercise monopoly powers over services that are mostly 
related, and often interdependent, a situation of competition amongst the few exists.   
 
Because bribery is an extra-legal activity49, participation elicits two specific risk factors; 
the prospect of penal sanctions, and the likelihood that the other party will not fulfill his 
promise. But since there is no legal recourse in the event of defaults, this introduces an 
element of the prisoner’s dilemma.50 However, the sustained presence and pervasiveness 
of bribery and corruption in developing countries arise from the fact that bribery amongst 
participants is usually not a one-time deal, but rather a repeated affair that gradually 
fosters mutual trust and dependability.51 Thus, when such cooperation is practiced long 
enough, there is a tendency to reach a state of equilibrium where corruption is the norm.52
 
  
For expositional simplicity, the ensuing analysis will assume the following: 
1. Services provided by government agents are identical, i.e. export-import licenses, 
drivers permits, housing contracts are identical regardless of the issuing source. 
 
2. The Principal-Agent relationship holds. A lower ranking government official (agent) 
collects bribes to be shared with a higher-ranking official (principal). However, 
agents may seize the opportunity to enhance personal benefits, and may do so without 
reporting the proceeds to principals. 
 
3. Agents have the power to restrict the supply of services, and may exercise this power 
in order to maximize bribe proceeds. Given the abysmal levels of salaries for low 
ranking officials and the infrequency of payments, this may well be the intended 
effects of the numerous rules and regulations frequently issued by government 
agencies. 
 
4. Since the product or service is produced by the government, the agent’s cost of 
provision (marginal cost)53 is zero, except in instances where significant effort is 
expended to complete the transaction. For this unique reason, the benefit-maximizing 
decision variable will be the amount or quantity of service rendered, not price.54
 
 
In analyzing the economic outcomes of bribery and corruption within the context of 
homogeneous oligopoly, one can look at corrupt government officials as a group with 
similar interests which offers a specialized set of services to the public. Police officers 
that man the network of roads can be regarded as such; same applies to customs officers, 
and heads of ministries responsible for granting government contracts. 
 
If bribery and corruption were legal, the opportunity for intra-group or inter-group 
collusive practices would be present. Thus, as cooperating monopolists, the bribery-
maximizing decision rule will approximate that of a monolithic monopoly,55 exacting the 
highest cost of corruption on the public through a relatively smaller supply of 
government services. But the need for secrecy and the fear of detection foreclose such 
cooperation among agents. We are thus left with two possibilities: (1) The case of 
competitive corruption, or (2) The case of imperfectly competitive corruption. 
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 The Case of Competitive Corruption 
If cooperation and, hence, collusive behavior are impossible, perhaps due to heightened 
political activity or stricter rules of accountability, agents may engage in mutually 
destructive competition, wherein each attempts to maximize his selfish interest in the 
short-run. Under competitive corruption, oligopolistic agents will behave like price-
takers,56
 
 thus equating marginal cost (MC) to price (P). But since MC = 0, they are 
obliged to accept any price above zero, and in turn supply indefinitely large amounts of 
their respective goods. The final outcome will be a competitive equilibrium in which 
price or bribery proceeds equal zero; in this state of affairs, corruption becomes 
pecuniarily unprofitable. Potential customers are here serviced by very competitive price-
takers (agents) that must now provide their services at no extra cost to customers, and 
require no further encouragement to facilitate services ordinarily called for by their 
offices. This outcome is usually a product of both political and economic competition that 
ultimately constrains bureaucratic corruption.  
The Case of Imperfectly Competitive Corruption 
In the normal run of things, agents in non-collusive oligopoly57 tend to compete amongst 
themselves, albeit imperfectly. Not yet able to overcome the prisoner’s dilemma, agents, 
realizing that they can improve their individual lot through bribery, increase individual 
efforts to this end by offering more services than are mutually beneficial. This reduces 
overall benefits and conduces to an unstable equilibrium condition. Here, the level of 
corruption remains remarkably high, but the size of benefits will be well below the 
optimum level. This model of corruption provides a better description of the bureaucratic 
corruption that exists in sub-Saharan Africa. At lower ministerial appointments, and in 
law enforcement agencies, corruption is endemic, and because of this, the size of bribe 
benefits is lower than what would have obtained if agents were oligopolistically 
collusive.58
 
 But while the overall level of benefits is reduced in this instance, it remains 
above zero. 
From both models of corruption, it follows that neither collusive nor explicit competition 
exists proper because of the need for secrecy. Thus the size of benefit from corruption 
would remain lower than what would have obtained under collusive corruption, but 
would, however, remain higher than potential proceeds under competitive corruption. 
Thus the most damaging effects of corruption occur when agents are able to collude, e.g. 
the former Soviet Union59 under communism where party leaders were able to exercise 
effective control of subordinates; and the Philippines under Marcos60 where bribes are 
shared by civil servants, and in return agree not to demand further bribe for the original 
transaction. The second most damaging effects of corruption arise when agents are 
imperfectly competitive, e.g. Sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria where the 
dictatorial control of government agencies is weak and often feckless.61 The least 
damaging effects of corruption will, therefore, be those of competitive corruption. Herein 
lies the social need for political competition, the assignment of property rights, a fair and 
free press to serve as the public’s eye, a strong and independent judiciary, and 
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transparency in government. When these conditions exist, corruption is reasonably 
contained.  
 
 Application of the Maastricht Guidelines to Bureaucratic Corruption 
At the outset, it must be emphasized that  rights-based initiatives adopted by states in 
furtherance of public welfare must normatively reflect international human rights 
standards with operational outcomes that promote and protect specific rights. It is also the 
case that rights-based analysis of government practices and public policies must be 
coherently broad and sufficiently robust in order to touch upon all conceivable effects on 
human rights. The difficulty with this requirement is that it is extremely difficult to gather 
empirical evidence in many instances where government actions have led to degradations 
of protected rights; this is particularly the case with bureaucratic corruption where, 
because it is practiced in secrecy, empirical evidence is hard to come by even though 
there is knowledge of its incidence, and the repercussions are widely felt. In such 
instances of failure in governance, knowledge, and consequences are reasonable 
substitutes for empirical evidence.   
 
 Violations of Economic Rights 
Reports from international organizations, such as Transparency International,62 and 
information obtained from complaints filed against states by its citizens63 show that 
corrupt government officials routinely embark on large-scale public projects in order to 
maximize their opportunities and benefits from graft. Examples include awarding major 
road constructions to friends and relatives that lack the capacity to execute the 
contracts,64 purchases of out-dated military equipments from Western countries at 
inflated prices,65 or receiving bribes from foreign firms for the privilege to produce goods 
or services in the country66. The common economic consequence of these activities is 
misallocation of resources – the roads remain in perpetual construction, and the same 
contracts are awarded repeatedly year after year;67 purchased military armaments are 
either used to suppress civil rights or are abandoned in warehouses;68
 
 goods and services 
produced by foreign firms would now cost more to produce. A powerful repercussion of 
continual misallocation of resources is retardation of economic growth, and hence 
continual contractions of developmental opportunities for individuals. 
These activities and their consequences on individual and collective opportunities violate 
various articles of the ICESCR, specifically, the right to work (ICESCR 6)69, the right to 
an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and housing (ICESCR 
11.1 & 11.2)70. A reference to the Maastricht Guidelines also shows in Art.II, 14(g)71
 
 that 
States would be in breach of their duties and obligations when such contractions in 
economic opportunities occur as a result of graft and bureaucratic corruption. 
 Violations of Social Rights and cultural Rights 
The annual reports of the United Nations Development Programme72 is rift with 
documentations of human rights abuses that stem from local efforts at development. The 
opportunities for such abuses generally occur when government officials lease territories 
to domestic or foreign companies for mining or oil explorations.73 Without proper 
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consideration to the consequences on the welfare of the local residents or indigenous 
groups that call the territory home, such projects invariably impose inordinate losses to 
these groups through degradation of the environment, and displacement without adequate 
compensations from the government.74 A good example of this is what happened to the 
Ogoni people75 in Nigeria where thousands were displaced from their traditional 
homeland, thus depriving them the right to self-determination, the ability to enjoy and 
pursue their cultural observances, and loss of their means of subsistence.76
 
 
 In these instances of displacement without adequate compensation, the rights to self-
determination (Art. 1, ICESCR), the right to freedom of cultural practices (Art. 15, 
ICESCR), the right to social security (Art. 9, ICESCR), and the right to education (Art. 
13, ICESCR) are all jeopardized, and possibly abridged. Never mind that Art. 2.1 of the 
ICESCR requires States “to take steps… to the maximum of available resources with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of recognized rights.”77
 
                                                      
Conclusion  
 The current literature on bureaucratic corruption has, to a large extent, concerned itself 
almost exclusively with the economic and wealth effects of corruption. This work, 
however, went beyond the conventional paradigm by introducing the human rights 
dimensions of bureaucratic corruption, and emphasized instances where certain kinds of 
official graft would lead to serious human rights abuses.  
 
Economic, social and cultural rights are not backward-looking or anti-progressive, and 
are very much as real as civil and political rights. To disengage one from the other is to 
marginalize the totality of rights, for each is an essential, albeit different, component of a 
comprehensive whole. President Roosevelt, in his 1944 State of the Union address could 
not have summarized this point any better when he remarked: 
 
“We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true 
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security 
and independence. Necessitous men are not free men. 
People who are out of a job are the stuff of which dictators 
are made.”78
 
  
These words remain cogent today as they were more than half a century ago. The least 
tenable position commonly taken by critiques of economic and social rights is the 
proposition that a formal declaration or guarantee cannot co-exist with actual provisions 
of benefits. On this ground, the erstwhile American Assistant Secretary of State, Schifter 
remarked: 
 “I once asked a representative from Zambia: ‘If children in 
your country are starving would they want a United 
Nations declaration on the right to food or would they want 
something to eat?’ What the world needs regarding 
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economic and social development is action-oriented 
programs, not declarations.”79
 
  
This is faulty reasoning to say the least, for there is no good reason why formal 
declarations of principles and the delivery of guaranteed benefits should be mutually 
exclusive. The effects of bureaucratic corruption, while initially felt through the 
degradation of rights contained in the ICESCR, ultimately perverts rights commonly 
found in ICCPR. The fact that we live in a world of rapid changes in economic, social 
and cultural affairs suggests that the way and manner governments address societal needs 
must change accordingly; this also means that human rights laws must be flexible enough 
to accommodate the changing needs of society. 
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